It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying informational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. We …rst show that if the model is of complete information a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it satis…es Maskin's monotonicity. We then extend this result to general incomplete information settings and show that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it is fully implementable in iterative dominance. For …nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient. We also discuss implications of this characterization for the virtual implementation approach.
Introduction
The notion of partial -as opposed to full -implementation consists in designing games under which some equilibrium -but not necessarily all -yields the outcome desired by the social planner. Despite the fact that undesirable equilibria may potentially exist, partial implementation is widely used both in theoretical and applied works. One of the main reasons for its success is the celebrated revelation principle: if the desired outcomes can arise as an equilibrium in some mechanism, then it will arise in a truth-telling equilibrium of the direct mechanism. It is then informally argued that truth-telling is a focal point and that agents should coordinate on this equilibrium when it exists. If the social planner is not perfectly sure that the information structure of the model he has in mind corresponds exactly to the true situation, the very notion of truth-telling strategy becomes problematic.
Nevertheless, the focal point argument used to defend the partial approach extends to this (more realistic) context: if an agent's type t is very "close" to a type t of the initial model, then reporting the message that corresponds to type t may reasonably be seen as a focal point for type t.
Following this line of thought and taking into account the doubts a social planer may have about his model, we characterize when a social choice function can be partially continuously implemented. More speci…cally, we require that in any perturbation of the initial model, there exists an equilibrium that yields the desired outcome, not only at all types of the initial model but also at all types "close" to initial types. Our main results state that this continuity requirement leads to necessary (and su¢ cient) conditions that are tightly linked to full implementation. Otherwise stated, this paper shows that the partial implementation paradigm is very fragile when slight modi…cations of the information structures are allowed.
In a …rst step, we focus on the simple case in which the initial model is of complete information. In this speci…c setting, widely used in mechanism design, the approach of partial implementation is very permissive. For instance, when there are at least three agents, any social choice function can be partially implemented 1 . Let us be more speci…c and describe our continuity requirement in this setting. A pro…le of complete information types may be seen as a pro…le of degenerate hierarchies of beliefs where every player knows the realized state of nature, every player knows that everyone knows and so on... Put in another way, the modeler studies a set of (degenerate) hierarchies of beliefs where some given state of nature is commonly known. In our setting, a pro…le of incomplete information types t is considered to be close to a pro…le t of complete information types (where it is common knowledge that the real state of nature is ) if, t induces hierarchies of beliefs where each player believes with a high probability that payo¤s are given by ; each player believes with a high probability that each player believes with a high probability that payo¤s are given by ; etc... up to high but …nite order. In our …rst result, we show that a social choice function is continuously implementable only if it satis…es Maskin's monotonicity. Many social choice functions are not monotonic and hence not continuously implementable. Since Maskin's monotonicity is necessary and (almost) su¢ cient for full Nash implementation in complete information settings (Maskin (1999) ), this result builds a …rst bridge between partial and full implementation. In other words, a lack of full implementation can be problematic even if the social planer is only willing to partially implement the social choice function.
Our continuity requirement naturally extends to the case where the initial model is of incomplete information. To formalize this, we use the method introduced by Harsanyi (1967) and developed in Mertens and Zamir (1985) . Each type in the initial model is mapped into a hierarchy of beliefs. Then, following the interim approach due to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), we de…ne a notion of "nearby" types. As already underlined in the complete information setting, this notion, formally described by the product topology in the universal type space, captures the restrictions on the modeler's ability to observe the players'(high order) beliefs. In this general setting, we provide our main result: if a social choice function is continuously implementable, then it must also be fully implementable in rationalizable messages. More precisely, we show that if some mechanism continuously implements a social choice function f , then we can extract from the initial mechanism a "smaller" mechanism that fully implements f in rationalizable messages. For …nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient 2 . Borgers (1995) shows that full implementation in rationalizable messages is a demanding notion when considering large preference domains. Virtual implementation corresponds to the requirement that the outcomes speci…ed by the social choice function arise with probability arbitrarily close to -but not necessarily equal to-one. Moving to virtual implementation may be seen as natural when considering continuity requirements. A corollary of our main result states that a social choice function is continuously virtually (partially) implementable with …nite mechanisms if and only if it is virtually (fully) implementable in rationalizable messages with …nite mechanisms.
While apparently similar to our main result, this characterization is actually much less demanding. Indeed, under virtual implementation, very permissive su¢ cient conditions have been established by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a,b) for the solution concept of rationalizability. More precisely, in complete information settings, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) shows that under very weak domain restrictions, if there are more than three players, any social choice function is virtually implementable in rationalizable messages. Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) extends this result to incomplete information: they show that Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and a measurability condition, which seems weak and generically satis…ed 3 , are both necessary and su¢ cient. In other terms, under the virtual approach, the gap between partial implementation (which is equivalent to Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) and full implementation in rationalizable messages is quite small.
Since mechanisms used in this literature are …nite, this means that when moving to virtual implementation, our continuity requirement leads to much less severe restrictions than for exact implementation. We interpret this result as a new argument in favor of the virtual approach: even if the social planer is only interested in partial implementation, considering Abreu and Matsushima's mechanisms makes sense.
Since the seminal paper by Rubinstein (1989) on the e-mail game, several approaches have been followed to analyze the connection between high order beliefs and strategic behavior; the so-called notion of robustness due to Kajii and Morris (1997) , the global games argument due to Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and the interim approach due to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) . These works share the common assumption that in the perturbed models, some types may have preferences that are radically di¤erent from those of types in the initial model 4 . Indeed, the behavior of these speci…c types is used as a starting point for contagion processes that drive results in these analyses. Note that the meaning of such an assumption in the mechanism design context (where the social planer …xes the game form) would be problematic. However, in the present paper, we show that the logic of implementation makes this assumption unnecessary. Indeed, in mechanism design, several di¤erent states of natures are ex ante possible for the social planer. Our argument in the proof uses this multiplicity and shows that this setting is then rich enough: partial implementation in the initial model is used as an (endogenous) starting point for the contagion process at equilibrium. It is then enough to assume that sending a message may involve an (arbitrarily) small cost. Since in many real economic situations sending a message is costly 5 , this technical assumption 6 is in the spirit of our local requirements: mechanisms that are not robust to an arbitrarily small departure from the assumption of costless messages are rather undesirable.
Our results also contribute to the literature on the so-called "Wilson doctrine" 7 . Bergemann and Morris (2005) is one of the …rst attempts to relax the implicit common knowledge assumptions made in the mechanism design literature. 8 In their setting, the modeler when choosing a mechanism has no information on the real situation that will …nally prevail among the agents 9 . Consequently, their notion of robust implementation follows a "global approach": a social choice function 10 is robustly (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable on all possible models. They show that a social choice function is robustly implementable if and only if it is ex-post implementable 11 . On the contrary, we assume that the planer has some speci…c model in mind and is quite con…dent about it. As a consequence, our requirement is only local: the social choice function must be implemented only at types "close" to types in the initial model. This is the reason why 5 For instance, sending a message in real life situations may consist in …lling in a questionnaire which is time-consuming and hence costly. It may sometimes require to present costly physical proofs such as observable characteristics of products, endowments... See Bull and Watson (2007) or Kartik and Tercieux (2009) for details. 6 In case a player has several best responses against some belief, this assumption allows us to build a small perturbation of the environment where this player has a unique best response. 7 Wilson (1987) writes "I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality". 8 Another related paper is Chung and Ely (2001). They study full implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium. They show that (under hedonic preferences), while almost all social choice functions are fully implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium, only monotonic social choice functions can be fully implemented in undominated Nash if we also require that no discontinuity occurs at complete information information. There are two main di¤erences with our work: …rst we focus on partial implementation, second the topology behind their continuity requirement is di¤erent from ours. See Kunimoto (2008) for additional details on their underlying topology. 9 Alternatively, Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2007) consider that the planer knows the (…nite set of) …rst-order beliefs of the agents. ex-post implementation is not necessary in our setting. 12 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the complete information case. In Section 3, we extend our notion of continuous implementation to incomplete information and give our main result. We conclude with a discussion of further issues in Section 4.
Complete Information Case
We …rst introduce the complete information setting and the notion of implementation under complete information. Then, we de…ne our main notion of continuous implementation.
Complete Information Implementation
We consider a …nite set of players I = f1; :::; Ig: Each agent i has a bounded utility function u i : A ! R where is the …nite 13 set of states of nature and A is the set of outcomes endowed with an arbitrary topology. A social choice function is a mapping f : ! A. 14 If the true state of nature is ; the planner would like the outcome to be f ( ):
A mechanism speci…es a message set M i for each agent i and a mapping g from message pro…les to outcomes. More precisely, we write M as an abbreviation for Q i2I M i and for each player i, M i for Q j6 =i M j . 15 A mechanism M is a pair (M; g) where the outcome function g : M ! A assigns to each message pro…le m an alternative g(m) 2 A. In what follows, we assume that message spaces are countable. 16 By a slight abuse of notations, we will sometimes note m for the degenerate distribution in (M ) assigning probability 1 to m.
For each 2 ; a mechanism M = (M; g) induces a complete information game
where each agent i's payo¤ when message pro…le m is sent is u i (g(m); ). We also denote the set of pure Nash equilibria in (M; ) by 1 2 It is not su¢ cient either. This is due to the fact that Bergemann and Morris (2005) use the so-called "known own payo¤ type" universal type space. To be more speci…c, they de…ne the set of states of nature by = i2I i where i is the set of player i's payo¤ types. Then, they assume that there is common knowledge that each player i knows his payo¤ type i.
1 3 The …niteness assumption is used to prove our main result (Theorem 2) but is not needed to establish the necessity of Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 1). 1 4 In the paper, we restrict our attention to social choice function for simplicity. Extensions to social choice correspondences will be discussed further. 1 5 Similar abbreviations will be used throughout the paper for analogous objects. 1 6 As will become clear, this assumption will allow us to prove our necessary conditions for continuous implementation using only models with a countable set of types. When moving to su¢ cient conditions, having models with countable set of types will be useful to apply standard existence theorems; see footnote 16 . 
Continuous Implementation
To de…ne our notion of continuous implementation,we embed the complete information setting in a richer setting that allows to perturb high order beliefs. We also relax the assumption that sending a message is perfectly costless.
Small costs of messages
We assume that sending a message may be slightly costly. Indeed, sending a message usually requires to …ll in a questionnaire, to write a letter and sometimes to present costly physical proofs such as observable characteristics of goods, endowments... A recent literature in implementation takes into account costs of messages 17 . We believe that a mechanism implementing a social choice function should still implement it when we allow for slight departures from the assumption of costless messages. In order to formalize this idea, we proceed as follows.
Given a mechanism M = (M; g), for each player i, we de…ne a cost function c i :
where~ is the space of states of nature associated with costs of messages.
We assume that the state space~ is rich enough. More precisely, it is de…ned bỹ
where for each player i and each message m i ; we have c i (
where is a strictly positive parameter that can be chosen arbitrarily close to 0. When no confusion arises, we will omit the dependence with respect to . Note that since M has been assumed to be countable,~ is also countable.
Next, we write = ~ for the extended set of states of nature. For a given state of nature = ( ;~ ) 2 ; the utility function of player i for a given message m i and a given outcome a is u i (a; ) c i (m i ;~ ). For notational convenience, we will sometimes identify and ( ;~ 0 ).
Technically, the above construction is used to break ties. More precisely, if a type is indi¤erent between several messages, we can slightly perturb his information so that this type has a unique best reply. Our basic point is that we want to allow a rich enough uncertainty such that for each message there exists a state of nature where the cost of this message is smaller than the other messages'costs. Note that this assumption is reminiscent of the richness assumption assumed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) . However, it is much weaker. Indeed, the richness assumption states that for any player i and any message m i , there exists a state nature where m i is strictly dominant for player i.
Models
There are two main classes of situations with incomplete information. The …rst one consists in situations with an ex ante stage during which each player observes a private signal about the payo¤s, and the joint distribution of signals and payo¤s is commonly known. These situations are naturally modelled using a standard type space. The second class, on which we focus in this paper, consists in genuine situations of incomplete information, i.e. situations with no ex ante stage: each player begins with a hierarchy of beliefs. We follow the standard Harsanyi (1967)'s approach and model these hierarchies of beliefs by introducing a hypothetical ex ante stage leading to a standard type space. This allows us to study strategic behavior of players at types that are considered to be close to a given original model.
A model T is a pair (T; ) where T = T 1 ::: T I is a countable 18 type space and
and a model T ; we write U (M; T ) for the induced incomplete information game. In this game, a (behavioral) strategy of a player i is any measurable function i :
We will note i (m i j t i ) for the probability that strategy i assigns to message m i when player i is of type t i . For each i 2 I and for each belief i 2 (
Given any type t i and any strategy pro…le i , we
for the joint distribution on the underlying uncertainty and the other players' messages induced by t i and i . 1 8 This assumption is just made to ensure existence of Bayes Nash equilibrium in …nite games which will turn out to be useful when we deal with su¢ cient conditions for continuous implementation. 
As speci…ed earlier, types close to complete information are types where it is mutually believed (with arbitrarily large probability) up to an arbitrarily large order that a given complete information situation occurred. More formally, given a model (T; ) and any type t i in type space T i , we can compute the belief of t i on (i.e. his …rst-order belief )
by
We can compute the second-order belief of t i ; i.e. his beliefs about ( ; h 1 1 (t 1 ); :::; h 1 I (t I )); by setting
We can compute an entire hierarchy of beliefs by proceeding in this way. Hence, a type of a player i induces an in…nite hierarchy
is a probability distribution representing the beliefs of i about and the other …rst order beliefs. Let us write h i (t i ) for the resulting hierarchy and h k i (t i ) for the kth-order beliefs of type t i . The set of all belief hierarchies for which it is common knowledge that the beliefs are coherent (i.e., each player knows his beliefs and his beliefs at di¤erent orders are consistent with each other) is the universal type space (see Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) ). We denote by T i the set of player i 0 s hierarchies of belief in this space and write
In our formulation, two types t and t are "close" if there exists a su¢ ciently "large" k such that for each l k; the lth-order beliefs h l (t) and h l ( t) are close in the topology of convergence of measures. To be more precise, each T i is endowed with the product topology, so that a sequence of types ft i [n]g 1 n=0 converges to a type t i ; if, for each
in the topology of weak convergence of measures 19 ). In such a case, we write t i [n] ! P t i . We will sometimes use the metric d k (:; :) on the kth level beliefs 20 that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of measures. 1 9 Recall that h where x denotes the probability distribution that puts probability 1 on fxg. It is easily checked that h i (t i; ) is the hierarchy of player i's beliefs corresponding to common knowledge 21 of ( ;~ 0 ). We will henceforth call the type t i; a complete information type.
The modeler is interested in strategic behavior of types where players mutually believe (with high probability) up to a high (but …nite) level that the state of nature is some 2 .
Our continuity requirement will ensure that the social choice function is implemented not only at complete information types but also at types that are so close to the complete information situation that they cannot be ruled out by the modeler.
In what follows, for two models T = (T; ) and T 0 = (T 0 ; 0 ) we will note T T 0 if
De…nition 4 Fix a mechanism M and a model T T CI . We say that an equilibrium in U (M; T ) continuously implements f if for each t 2 T CI , (i) (t ) is pure and (ii) for any sequence t[n] ! P t where for each n :
Notice that point (i) maintains the requirement of pure strategy behavior usually assumed in implementation theory; this will allow for simple comparisons with existing results 22 . We now state a formal de…nition of continuous implementation.
De…nition 5 A social choice function f : ! A is continuously implementable if there exists a mechanism M, such that for any model T T CI , there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the induced game U (M; T ) which continuously implements f .
Monotonicity as a Necessary Condition
In this section, we show that any social choice function that is continuously implementable satis…es the well-known monotonicity condition as de…ned in Maskin (1999) . This result, which is a …rst step toward our main result, reduces the gap between partial and full implementation since -as proved by Maskin -this monotonicity condition is necessary and "almost" su¢ cient for full implementation 23 .
Let us …rst recall the de…nition of monotonicity for social choice functions. 2 1 In this paper, we do not distinguish common knowledge and common belief. 2 2 This assumption is dispensible for our main result (Theorem 2). In addition, provided that the de…nition of monotonicity is extended to lotteries, Theorem 1 also extends. 2 3 Maskin (1999) showed that with more than three players together with the assumption that f satis…es the weak condition of No Veto Power, monotonicity actually implies full implementation.
De…nition 6 A social choice function f is monotonic if for every pair of states and 0 such that for each player i and for each a 2 A;
We now state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1 A social choice function is continuously implementable only if it is monotonic.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that there exists a mechanism M = (M; g) that continuously implements f: Pick ; 0 2 such that for each player i and for each a 2 A;
the relation (?) is satis…ed. We want to show that f ( ) = f ( 0 ).
We show that there exists a model T = (T; ) such that for any equilibrium that continuously implements f , there is a sequence of types
For this purpose, we build the desired model (T; ) in which for each player i, each set T i satis…es:
! where t i (k; m) and are de…ned recursively as follows. For each m = (m 1 ; :::; m I ) 2 M :
and
In addition, for each k 2; t i (k; m) is de…ned by
Observe that since M has been assumed to be countable, each T i is countable, and so is T .
Now pick any equilibrium of the induced game U (M; T ) that continuously implements f . By point (i) in De…nition 4; (t ) is a pure Nash equilibrium in the complete information game (M; ). In addition, point (ii) in De…nition 4 implies that g (t ) = f ( ).
In the sequel, we note m i := i (t i; ) and m := (t ). We have for any player i and
and so,
By (?); this implies that
which in turn implies
i.e. m is a pure Nash equilibrium in (M; 0 ). Otherwise stated, for each player i :
and since is an equilibrium:
Using a similar reasoning, it is easy to show inductively that for all k 2
This means that for each k 1; g (t(k; m )) = g(m ) = f ( ) and so obviously, g (t(k; m )) ! f ( ) (as k ! 1) which completes the proof since t(k; m ) ! P t 0 (as
One may think that our strong result stems from lack of a common prior in the model we build. However, it is possible to slightly perturb the conditional beliefs of types in our model so that using an argument due to Lipman (2003 Lipman ( , 2005 , these types could be picked from models where players share a common prior.
Our paper focuses on social choice functions; for social choice correspondences, two de…nitions of partial implementation coexist. To be more speci…c, in the …rst de…nition, which is "weak", a social choice correspondence F : A is partially implementable if there exists a mechanism M and a selection f of F such that the mechanism M partially implements f . In the second de…nition, which is "strong", a social choice correspondence
A is partially implementable if there exists a mechanism M that partially implements each selection f of F . Maskin (1999) gives a de…nition of Maskin monotonicity for social choice correspondences 24 and shows that under the same conditions as for social choice functions, this notion implies "strong" full implementation, i.e. that there exists a mechanism M such that for each : F ( ) = g(N E(M; )); note that the mechanism M partially implements each selection of F . Using a "strong" de…nition of continuous partial implementation, Theorem 1 can easily be extended to social choice correspondences.
It is clear that if a mechanism continuously implements a social choice function, then it must partially implement in NE this social choice function. If we add the requirement that it must partially implement in strict NE, then we may dispense with the assumption on cost of messages. In this case, a necessary condition would be the strict monotonicity condition (i.e. where the inequalities in the de…nition of monotonicity are replaced by strict inequalities).
Incomplete Information
So far, we focused our attention on situations where the planer has a complete information setting in mind. We now relax this assumption and consider the general case where the initial model of the planer is (potentially) an incomplete information one. As before, the modeler wants to see how strategic behavior is a¤ected under his mechanism when the assumption that his model is common knowledge is relaxed. We now move to our main result which establishes a tight connection between our notion of continuous implementation and full implementation in rationalizable messages.
De…nitions
We …rst extend the de…nition of continuous implementation to an incomplete information setting. In the sequel, we …x a …nite 25 model T = ( T ; ) which is the model the planer has in mind.
De…nition 7 Fix a mechanism M and a model T T , we say that an equilibrium in U (M; T ) continuously implements f if for each t 2 T , (i) ( t) is pure and (ii) for any sequence t[n] ! P t where for each n : we have b 2 F ( 0 ). 2 5 The …niteness assumption allows to prove Theorem 2 using only models that are countable which again will be useful when moving to su¢ ciency results. 
Necessary Condition
Our characterization result relies on the notion of full implementation in rationalizable messages. First, let us recall the de…nition of (interim correlated) rationalizability given in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006, 2007) . Pick any pro…le of types t drawn from some arbitrary model T = (T;
where marg
where
The set of all rationalizable messages for player i (with type t i ) is
Remark 1 Lipman (1994) gives an alternative de…nition of rationalizability for the case of countable action sets. While his de…nition is consistent with common knowledge of rationality, the one we use in this paper is a coarser solution concept. Using a coarser solution concept strengthens our necessary condition; this condition will remain valid under any …ner notion of rationalizability. Our su¢ ciency results will be proved for …nite mechanisms where both concepts coincide.
We say that a social choice function is fully implementable in rationalizable messages, or simply fully rationalizable implementable, if there is a mechanism M so that at each pro…le of types t 2 T : m 2 R 1 ( t j M; T ) ) g(m) = f ( t). In the sequel, for two
where g jM 0 denotes the restriction of g to M 0 .
Our main theorem is stated as follows.
Theorem 2 A social choice function f : T ! A is continuously implementable with a mechanism M only if it is fully rationalizable implementable by some mechanism M 0 M.
The above result states a necessary condition for continuous implementation. When moving to su¢ ciency, existence of equilibria becomes an issue. Given that the set of messages may be in…nite, there may exist models where no equilibrium exists even if f is fully rationalizable implementable (in the model T ). However, this condition will turn to be su¢ cient when considering …nite mechanisms.
Note that if f is continuously implementable, then it is partially implementable. Hence, the previous result shows that full implementation in (Bayes) Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition for continuous implementation. Jackson (1991) has extended Maskin's monotonicity to incomplete information settings. He de…nes Bayesian monotonicity and shows that this notion is a necessary condition for full implementation in Nash equilibria in incomplete information settings. Hence, as a corollary of the above result, we get that Bayesian monotonicity is also necessary for continuous implementation which generalizes our Theorem 1. 26 Finally, using the "weak" de…nition of partial implementation for social choice correspondences given in Section 2.3, it is possible to extend Theorem 2 and to establish that a necessary condition for F to be (weakly) continuously implementable is that F must be (weakly) fully implementable in rationalizable messages (i.e. there is a mechanism M and a selection f of F such that M full implements f in rationalizable messages.) 27 Let us move now to the proof of Theorem 2. Since f is continuously implementable, there exists a mechanism M = (M; g), such that for any model T = (T; ), there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the induced game U (M; T ) where for each t 2 T , (i) ( t) is pure and (ii) for any sequence t[n] ! P t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we have g (t[n]) ! f ( t).
We let be the set of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria of U (M; T ). Note that because T is …nite and M is countable, is countable. For each 2 ; we build the set of message pro…les M ( ) in the following way.
For each player i and each positive integer k, we de…ne inductively
Then, for each k 1 :
Recall that in the model T = ( T ; ); marg~ t i (~ 0 ) = 1, for each i and t i 2 T i . Since
In the sequel, for each 2 , we will note M( ) the mechanism (M ( ); g jM ( ) ).
Notice that given any model T = (T; ) such that T T , T is a belief closed subspace in T , i.e., for any i and t i 2 T i : marg T i t i ( T i ) = 1. Hence, for any model T T and any equilibrium in U (M; T ); the restriction of to T -denoted j T -is an equilibrium in U (M; T ). A …rst interesting property of the family of sets fM ( )g 2 is as follows:
there is a model T T for which any equilibrium in U (M; T ) has full range in M ( j T )
i.e. each message pro…le in M ( j T ) is played under at some pro…le of types in the model T . More precisely, Proposition 1 is the …rst step of the proof of Theorem 2.
Proposition 1 There exists a model T =(T; ) such that for any 2 and m 2 M ( ),
Proof. We build the model T =(T; ) as follows. For each equilibrium 2 , player i and integer k , we de…ne inductively t i [ ; k; m i ] for each m i 2 M k i ( ) and set
Note that T i is countable. In the sequel, we …x an arbitrary 2 . This equilibrium is sometimes omitted in our notations.
For each k 1 and m i 2 M k i ( ), we know that there exists
). Thus we can build^
In the sequel, for each player i and m i 2 M 0 i ( ), we pick one type denoted
This probability measure is well-de…ned since^
In the same way, for each k > 1 and m i 2 M k i ( ), we de…ne inductively t i [ ; k; m i ] by:
Again, this probability measure is well-de…ned since^
To complete the proof, we show that for any equilibrium of U (M; T ) such that j T = , we have:
for each player i, integer k and message m i 2 M k i ( ): The proof proceeds by induction on k.
First note that, by construction, of t i [ ; 0; m i ], we must have for any equilibrium of
for each player i and message m i 2 M 0 i ( ): Now, assume that Equation (1) is satis…ed at rank k 1 and let us prove it is also satis…ed at rank k. Fix any m i 2 M k i ( ) and any equilibrium of
In addition, by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that is an equilibrium of U (M; T )
We now give a …rst insight on the second step of the proof of our main result. First notice that, by construction, each M ( ) satis…es the following closure property: taking
Now pick a type t i 2 T i and a message m i 2 R 1 i ( t i jM( ); T ), it is possible to add a type t i so that m i becomes a unique best reply. So let us assume for simplicity that fm i g = BR i (marg 
By construction, Supp( i (t
. By the closure property described above, BR i (marg
i j M( )) and so we get that type t m i i plays m i under the equilibrium and will satisfy the desired property. Using a similar reasoning, we show inductively the following "contagion" result.
Proposition 2 There exists a modelT = (T ;^ ) such that for each equilibrium 2 and each player i the following holds. For all t i 2 T i and
Proof. See Appendix.
We are now in a position to complete the proof of our main Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. PickT = (T ;^ ) as de…ned in Proposition 2. By de…nition of continuous implementation, there exists an equilibrium in U (M;T ) that continuously implements f and point (i) in De…nition 7 ensures that j T is a pure equilibrium. Now pick any t 2 T and m 2 R 1 ( t j M( j T ); T ), we show that g jM ( j T ) (m) = f ( t) proving that the mechanism M( j T ) full implements f in rationalizable messages.
Applying Proposition 2, we know that there exists a sequence of types ft[n]g 1 n=0 in T such that (1)t[n] ! P t and (2) (t[n]) = m for all n. By (1) and the fact that continuously implements f , we have g (t[n]) ! f ( t) while by (2) we have g (t[n]) = g(m) for all n. Hence, we must have g(m) = f ( t) and so g jM ( j T ) (m) = f ( t) as claimed.
A Characterization
Our main Theorem provides a necessary condition for continuous implementation. Now, we show that if we restrict our attention to …nite mechanisms, this condition is actually su¢ cient.
Theorem 3 A social choice function f is continuously implementable by a …nite mechanism if and only if it is fully rationalizable implementable by a …nite mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 3. The only if part is proved by Theorem 2. Let us prove the if part. Assume that f : T ! A is fully rationalizable-implementable by a …nite mechanism in T , if t[n] ! P t then, for n large enough, we have R 1 (t[n] j M; T ) R 1 ( t j M; T ).
(2) For any type t 2 T : R 1 (t j M; T ) is non-empty. Now pick any model T = (T; ) such that T T , we show that there exists an equilibrium that continuously implements f . Because M is …nite and T is countable, standard arguments show that there exists a Bayes Nash equilibrium in U (M; T ). Pick any se-
In addition, for n large enough, we know by Lemma 1 that
Theorem 3 allows to give a new rationale for the notion of virtual implementation where …nite mechanisms are usually used.
In the sequel, we assume that A is a metric space and note d the associated metric. Given a social choice function f; for each > 0, we note B (f ) = ff 0 : T ! A :
d(f 0 ( t); f ( t)) < for all t 2 T g. A social choice function f is said to be partially virtually implementable by …nite mechanisms if for each > 0; there exists a social choice function f 0 2 B (f ) that is partially implementable by a …nite mechanism (that may depend on ).
In the same way, we can extend the de…nition of continuous implementation.
De…nition 9 A social choice function f is virtually continuously implementable by …nite mechanisms if for all > 0, there exists a social choice function f 0 2 B (f ) that is continuously implementable by a …nite mechanism.
We also say that a social choice function f is virtually fully rationalizable implementable by …nite mechanisms if for all > 0, there exists a social choice function f 0 2 B (f ) that is fully rationalizable implementable by a …nite mechanism. Using Theorem 3 above we can extend our characterization result to virtual implementation. Compatibility and a measurability condition are both necessary and su¢ cient for virtual implementation in rationalizable messages. The measurability condition seems weak and is generically satis…ed 30 . Hence, any social choice function that is partially implementable (which is equivalent to Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) is virtually implementable in rationalizable messages. Since mechanisms used in these papers are …nite, we know by Proposition 3 that they also ensures virtual continuous implementation. Hence, we believe that Proposition 3 provides a new foundation to the approach of virtual implementation in rationalizable messages.
Discussion

Failure of the Revelation Principle
We present a variant of the well-known Solomon's predicament and establish that the revelation principle does not hold for continuous implementation.
Each of two agents, 1 and 2, claims an object. There are two payo¤ types: at 1 (resp.
2 ), player 1 (resp. player 2) is the legitimate owner. The set of outcomes is A = f(x; p 1 ; p 2 ) j x 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g and p 1 ; p 2 2 R + g where p i is the level of the …ne imposed on player i and the variable x correspond to the following situations. If x = 0, the object is not given to either player; if x 2 f1; 2g, it is attributed to player x, and if x = 3, both players are "punished"and the none of them receive the object. The social planner wishes to give the good to the true owner, i.e. he wants to implement continuously the social choice function f : f 1 ; 2 g ! A for which f ( 1 ) = (1; 0; 0) and f ( 2 ) = (2; 0; 0). Utility functions are assumed to be quasi-linear and the object to have a monetary value for each player. More precisely, this value for player i is v H if he is the legitimate owner of the object and v L if he is not, with v H > v L > 0. Finally, the punishment outcome (x = 3) corresponds to a …ne f L for player i if he is the legitimate owner and to a …ne f H if he is not, with f H > f L > 0. For instance when the payo¤ type is 1 ; the utility of player 1 when the outcome is (3; p 1 ; p 2 ) is: u 1 ((3; p 1 ; p 2 ); 1 ) = f L p 1 and when outcome (1;
The following two claims establish the failure of the revelation principle when a continuity requirement is taken into account.
Claim 1 f is not continuously implementable with a direct mechanism i.e. a mechanism M = (M; g) in which for each i 2 f1; 2g, M i = f 1 ; 2 g.
Proof.
We establish that no mechanism M 0 M can fully implement in NE the social choice function f . Theorem 2 completes the proof of Claim 1. Obviously, f cannot be implemented if the set of message pro…les is a singleton. Now assume that the set of message pro…les is a singleton for one player, say player 1, i.e.
M 0 1 = f g for some 2 f 1 ; 2 g and M 0 2 = f 1 ; 2 g. In this case, player 2 must have a message m 2 such that g(m 2 ; ) = (2; 0; 0). Then, m 2 strictly dominates any message that yields outcome (1; 0; 0). Hence, (1; 0; 0) cannot be an equilibrium outcome at state 1 .
Finally, we show that the direct mechanism M cannot fully implement in NE the social choice function f . Proceed by contradiction and assume that there exist two message
. It is easily checked that for each player i : m i; 1 6 = m i; 2 , otherwise, at some state, one player would have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium. Now for message pro…le (m 1; 1 ; m 2; 2 ), there is (at least) one player who does not receive the object. Assume without loss of generality that this is player 1 (a similar reasoning holds for player 2). Let us show that necessarily, m 2 = (m 1; 2 ; m 2; 2 ) is a pure Nash equilibrium at 1 . Since g(m 1; 2 ; m 2; 2 ) = (2; 0; 0) is the best outcome for player 2, he has no incentive to deviate. We also know by construction that if player 1 deviates, the outcome is g(m 1; 1 ; m 2; 2 ) = (x; p 1 ; p 2 ) where player 1 does not get the object. Hence,
); 1 ) = u 1 ((2; 0; 0); 1 ) = 0 u 1 ((x; p 1 ; p 2 ); 1 ) = u 1 (g(m 1; 2 ; m 2; 2 ); 1 ) and so player 1 does not have any incentive to deviate either. Thus f is not fully implementable by M which completes the proof.
However, as we will show in the following lines, when we expand the set of messages using indirect mechanisms, f can be continuously implemented.
Claim 2 There exists an indirect mechanism that continuously implements f .
Proof. Consider the following indirect mechanism. Each player has three possible messages (Mine, His, and Mine+) and the outcome function is given by the matrix below, where v L < P < v H ; f L < p < f H , and > p. 31 
Mine
His Mine+ Mine (0; ; ) (1; 0; 0) (2; ; P ) His (2; 0; 0) (0; ; ) (0; p; 0)
Mine+ (1; P; ) (0; 0; p) (3; 0; 0)
At 1 , action "His" is strictly dominated by "Mine+"for player 1. Consequently, in the second round of elimination, "Mine" and "Mine+" are strictly dominated by "His" 3 1 Using the usual convention, player 1 is the row player while player 2 is the column player.
for player 2 at 1 . Finally, in the third round, "Mine"is strictly better than "Mine+" for player 1. Hence, (M ine; His) is the unique rationalizable action pro…le at 1 . A symmetric reasoning applies at 2 . By Theorem 3, we conclude that this …nite indirect mechanism implements continuously the social choice function f .
Alternative Topology: Uniform Convergence
In this paper, we de…ne the notion of continuous implementation using the topology of point-wise convergence. This topology is standard when working in the universal type space and has a simple interpretation. However, other topologies are interesting and so other notions of continuous implementation are worth to be investigated. One natural candidate is the topology of uniform convergence. 32 While interesting in its own right, we show that all social choice functions that are partially implementable in strict Nash equilibria with a …nite mechanism are continuously implementable under this topology.
This condition is much weaker than the one obtained under the topology of point-wise convergence. In particular, recall that in complete information settings, under mild conditions 33 and with more than three players, any social function is partially implementable in strict Nash equilibria with a direct mechanism (and so with a …nite mechanism in our setting).
To introduce the topology of uniform convergence, we …rst recall the de…nition of the Prohorov distance that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of measures. Given a metric space (X; ) the Prohorov distance between any two ; 0 2 (X) is inff > 0 : 0 (A) (A ) + for every Borel set A Xg where A = fx 2 X : inf y2A (x; y) < g.
Write X 0 = and for each k 1 :
be the discrete metric on and d 1 the Prohorov distance on 1st level beliefs ( ).
Then, recursively, for any k 2, let d k be the Prohorov distance on the kth level be- 
in this case we write t i [n] ! U t i . We also write t[n] ! U t; if, t i [n] ! U t i ; for each i 2 I. In this topology, two types are close if they have very similar …rst-order beliefs, second order-beliefs and so on up to in…nity where the degree of 3 2 Another topology in the universal type space is the strategic topology as de…ned in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006) . Di Tillio and Faingold (2007) established the equivalence between uniform topology and strategic topology around …nite types. Since T is …nite, the result of this section is also true under the strategic topology. 3 3 For instance in quasi-linear settings with arbitrary small transfers.
similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. 34 De…nition 10 A social choice function f : T ! A is continuously implementable w.r.t.
! U if there exists a mechanism M such that for any model T T , there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the induced game U (M; T ) where for each t 2 T , (i) ( t) is pure and (ii)
for any sequence t[n] ! U t where for each n :
Recall that a pro…le of strategies = ( 1 ; :::; I ) is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in U (M; T ) if for each i 2 I; and for each t i 2 T i ;
We say that a social choice function f : T ! A is partially SNE-implementable if there exists a mechanism M and a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in the induced game U (M; T )
where for each t 2 T , g ( t) = f ( t). We can now state a simple su¢ cient condition for continuous implementation w.r.t. uniform convergence.
Proposition 4
If f is partially SNE-implementable by a …nite mechanism then it is continuously implementable w.r.t. ! U .
Proof. In the sequel, we use the following notations. For any i; t i 2 T i , and each k,
In addition, given a model T = (T; ) T , and any type t i 2 T i , we write C k ( t i ) for the
is an open ball w.r.t. the distance d k de…ned over (X k 1 ). In a similar way, C ( t i ) denotes the set ft i 2 T i :
Lemma 2 Pick any model T = (T; ) T . There exists > 0 such that for all < , all t i 2 T i and t i 2 C ( t i ) :
for all t i 2 T i and 2 .
Proof. For each i; t i 2 T i , there exists a unique probability measure t i 2 (
whose marginal k t i on X k 1 coincides with h k i (t i ) for each k 1. By de…nition of the Prohorov metric, for any > 0; t i 2 T i and t i 2 C ( t i ) :
for each k, t i and . (Where in the de…nition of Prohorov metric, we respectively use as
Since T is …nite, there is K large enough so that for all k K; t i 2 T i and t i 2 T i :
. Hence, for all k K; by (2) :
for each t i and . Note that C (
Hence, by continuity from above of probability measures, we get
Thus, we have
for all t i 2 T i and .
Now, we have to show that for > 0 small enough, for each t i 2 T i and t i 2 C ( t i ) :
for all t i 2 T i and and the proof will be complete. By (3), we have for each t i 2 T i and t i 2 T i such that t i 2 C ( t i ) :
for each k, t i 2 T i and . Since T is …nite, we have that for small enough and k large enough: C k 1 2
for all t i 2 T i and . Since C (
, this yields the desired result.
Pick the …nite mechanism M under which there exists a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in the induced game U (M; T ) where for each t 2 T , g ( t) = f ( t). Let us show that this mechanism continuously implements f w.r.t. ! U . Since is a strict Nash equilibrium and the sets T , M and so by construction are …nite, we know that there exists " > 0 such that for each i 2 I and each t i 2 T i ; 35 Consider the induced game U (M; T ) and build a modi…ed game U (M; T ) where for each player i, the set of strategies is restricted to
where > 0 is assumed to be small.
Since M is …nite and T is countable, standard arguments show the existence of a Bayes Nash equilibrium in U (M; T ). Note that for each t 2 T , (i) ( t) = ( t) since t 2 C ( t) and so ( t) is pure and (ii) for any sequence t[n] ! U t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we
show that is an equilibrium of the original game U (M; T ). It is clear that whenever
since the set of available actions is not modi…ed for these types from U (M; T ) to U (M; T ). Now, pick
Assuming is small enough, by Lemma 2 and the construction of i , we obtain that k i ( j t i ; i ) i ( j t i ; i )k " and so by (4), playing i ( t i ) is the unique best reply.
Ex ante approach vs. interim approach
In this article, we formalized the notion of proximity using the interim approach due to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the notion of type. In this approach, the modeler has in mind a set of hierarchies of beliefs and is interested in the strategic behavior of any type close to some type of the original model. It is possible to build another test of continuity using the ex ante approach due to Kajii and Morris (1997) and the notion of model. We brie ‡y expose in the following lines the ex ante approach for the simpli…ed case in which the initial model is a complete information one. While in our article types are de…ned using conditional beliefs, some speci…cation of the prior distribution for each player is needed to build a perturbation under the ex ante approach. More precisely, a perturbation will be considered as close to the initial model if the set of types that are close to complete information types (as de…ned in our paper) has an ex ante probability that is close to one. A social choice function is ex ante continuously implementable if in any perturbation (arbitrarily) close to complete information, there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium such that the social choice function is implemented with an (arbitrarily) high ex ante probability.
While this notion can be seen as less permissive than the one de…ned in our paper, Oyama we allow players to have heterogenous prior beliefs. Hence, we believe that our results would be maintained when considering ex ante continuous implementation if a common prior is not assumed to hold. The characterization of ex ante continuous implementation under the common prior assumption is an open question which is left for further research.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
We de…ne the set C by:
Now we build the modelT = (T ;^ ) as follows. For each " 2 C, k, 2 , t i 2 T i and m i 2 R k i ( t i j M( ); T ), we build inductivelyt i ["; k; ; t i ; m i ] and set
where T i is de…ned as in Proposition 1. Note thatT i is countable.
In the sequel, we …x an arbitrary 2 . This equilibrium is sometimes omitted in our notations.
We know that for each k; player i of type t i 2 T i and m i 2 R k i ( t i j M( ); T ), there exists 
where x denotes the probability distribution that puts probability 1 on fxg. To prove this claim we will use the following well-known lemma.
Lemma 3 (Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) )
Let T = (T; ) be any model such that T is complete and separable and t i is a continuous function of t i . Then, the mapping h : T ! T is continuous.
Proof of Claim 3. In the sequel, we will note h the (continuous) mapping that projects T into T and, in a similar way,ĥ the (continuous) mapping fromT to T . Proof. Fix a type t i 2 T i and an equilibrium of U (M;T ) satisfying j T = . We will show by induction on k that for all " > 0 and 
